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The rapid rise of antibiotic resistance is a serious threat to global public health. Without further
incentives, pharmaceutical companies have little interest in developing antibiotics, since the success
probability is low and development costs are huge. The situation is exacerbated by the “antibiotics
dilemma”: Developing narrow-spectrum antibiotics against resistant bacteria is most beneficial for
society, but least attractive for companies since their usage is more limited than for broad-spectrum
drugs and thus sales are low. Starting from a general mathematical framework for the study of
antibiotic-resistance dynamics with an arbitrary number of antibiotics, we identify efficient treat-
ment protocols and introduce a market-based refunding scheme that incentivizes pharmaceutical
companies to develop narrow-spectrum antibiotics: Successful companies can claim a refund from a
newly established antibiotics fund that partially covers their development costs. The proposed re-
fund involves a fixed and variable part. The latter (i) increases with the use of the new antibiotic for
currently resistant strains in comparison with other newly developed antibiotics for this purpose—
the resistance premium—and (ii) decreases with the use of this antibiotic for non-resistant bacteria.
We outline how such a refunding scheme can solve the antibiotics dilemma and cope with various
sources of uncertainty inherent in antibiotic R&D. Finally, connecting our refunding approach to
the recently established antimicrobial resistance (AMR) action fund, we discuss how the antibiotics
fund can be financed.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), antibiotic resistances are a serious threat to global public
health [1]. Some studies see in the emergence of antimicrobial resistances (AMR) the beginning of a postantibiotic
era and a threat similar to the one posed by climate change [2]. In the European Union, more than 33,000 people die
every year due to infections caused by drug-resistant microbes and the corresponding yearly AMR-related healthcare
costs and productivity losses are estimated to be more than 1.5 billion Euros [3].
Antibiotic resistances result from mutations in microbes and from evolutionary pressure, which selects those mu-
tations that are resistant against certain antibiotics. The large-scale use of antibiotics in medical and agricultural
settings in high-income countries led to the emergence of various multi-resistant strains. Recent findings indicate
that certain strains of Enterobacteriaceae even developed resistances against the usually highly-effective class of car-
bapenems [4]. Carbapenems are so-called drugs of last resort and only used if other antibiotic agents fail to stop the
propagation of microbes.
The reasons for the development of bacterial resistances and the decline in effective treatment possibilities are
multifaceted. Historically, pharmaceutical companies focused on the development of broad-spectrum antibiotics that
target various strains as is the case for certain β-lactam antibiotics, whose second and third generation compounds
were intentionally developed to target a broader spectrum of microbes [5, 6]. The rationale behind this development
is that it offers pharmaceutical companies a higher return than the development of antibiotics that only target specific
strains. In addition, broad-spectrum agents can be prescribed fast and without—or only with limited—diagnosis
effort. On the downside, the use of broad-spectrum antibiotics seems to be correlated with an increase in antibiotic
resistances [6–10]. Another disadvantage of broad-spectrum agents is that they are associated with outbreaks of
C. difficile infections that result from antibiotic-induced disturbances of the gut microbiome [6, 11, 12].
These examples illustrate that the use of narrow-spectrum antibiotics may lead to a slower development of antibiotic
resistance and to lower risks of C. difficile infections. However, the treatment of microbial infections with narrow-
spectrum agents requires efficient diagnostic techniques to quickly and precisely determine the type of bacterial strain
that causes a certain infection [6]; still, the clinical diagnosis of bacterial strains is often based on traditional and slow
microbial-culture methods [13]. Only more recently, progress in the development of advanced diagnostic techniques
made it possible to reduce the diagnosis time from a few days to only a few hours only [14].1
The notions of “narrow” and “broad” spectrum antibiotics are only loosely defined. Some studies distinguish
between antibiotics that are applicable to Gram-positive and Gram-negative strains of microbes. The distinction
between these two categories is based on the so-called Gram strain test, which categorizes bacteria into these categories
according to physiological properties of their cell walls. As in Ref. [6], we will reserve the term “narrow-spectrum”
for antibiotics that only affect one strain or a small number of strains when given to a patient.
Treatment strategies involving narrow-spectrum antibiotics have been implemented by some northern-European
countries such as Norway and Sweden [17, 18]. The Norwegian strategy is based on penicillin G and aminoglycoside
as initial treatment substances [17] and it avoids broad-spectrum β-lactam antibiotics. However, further studies are
necessary to better understand the influence of such narrow-spectrum treatment approaches on the population level
over time.
The objective of policy is to devise strategies that help incentivizing pharmaceutical companies to focus on the
development of narrow-spectrum antibiotics. According to a recent report of the European Court of Auditors [19],
“the antimicrobials market lacks commercial incentives to develop new treatments”. It suggests to reallocate some
of the EU AMR research budget to create economic incentives for pharmaceutical companies [20]. In the US, the
Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act from 2012 pursues similar goals by “stimulating the development
and approval of new antibacterial and antifungal drugs” [21].
In this paper, we develop a complementary approach by constructing a refunding scheme for successful developments
of antibiotics. The development costs of new antibiotics can amount to several billion USD and the probability of a
successful development might be only a few percent [22, 23]. Our refunding scheme aims at making the development
of new narrow-spectrum antibiotics nevertheless commercially viable. This can be achieved by creating an antibiotics
fund and implementing a refunding scheme for it. The refunding scheme rewards companies that have successfully
developed a new antibiotic (narrow or broad) as follows. A successful company can claim a refund from the antibiotics
fund to partially cover its development costs. The proposed refund involves a fixed and variable part. The variable
part increases with the use of the new antibiotic for currently resistant strains in comparison with other newly
developed antibiotics for the same purpose—the resistance premium—and (ii) decreases with the use of this antibiotic
for non-resistant bacteria. With an appropriate choice of refunding parameters, it becomes commercially attractive
to develop a narrow-spectrum antibiotic, or to switch to such an antibiotic if it becomes feasible in the R&D process,
1 For further information on tailored antibiotic treatment approaches (i.e., personalized medicine), see also Refs. [15, 16].
3Figure 1. Number of registered antibiotics. We show the number of registered or patented antibiotics from 1890-2020 [28].
while developing broad-spectrum antibiotics becomes less attractive. The antibiotics fund, in turn, is continuously
financed by fees levied on the use of existing antibiotics, and should be started by initial contributions from the
industry and public institutions like the recent AMR Action fund.2
In Sec. II, we provide further details on the rationale of developing incentives for the development of narrow-spectrum
antibiotics. To formulate our refunding approach, we first introduce a mathematical framework of antibiotic-resistance
dynamics in Sec. III. Our framework is able to account for an arbitrary number of different antibiotics, whereas previous
models [24–26] only considered two to three distinct antibiotics and compared different treatment protocols such as
temporal variation and combination therapy. Similar “low-dimensional” descriptions of antibiotic resistance have been
used to study the economic problem of optimal antibiotic use [27].
In Sec. IV, we use our general framework to derive a model variant that allows us to study the “antibiotics dilemma”:
Developing narrow-spectrum antibiotics, which are only effective against specific bacterial strains, is most beneficial
for society, but least attractive for pharmaceutical companies due to their limited usage and sales volumes. We couple
this variant of the general antibiotics model to our refunding scheme in Sec. V and illustrate how refunding can lead to
better treatment protocols and a lower share of resistant strains. The refund for the development of a certain antibiotic
covers part of the development costs and satisfies the following properties: (i) The refund is strongly increasing with
the use of the new antibiotic for currently resistant bacteria in comparison with other newly developed antibiotics for
this purpose. (ii) The refund decreases with the use of this antibiotic for non-resistant bacteria in comparison with
other antibiotics used for this purpose. In Sec. VI, we outline possibilities to design refunding schemes in terms of the
general antibiotic-resistance model of Sec. III. We conclude our study in Sec. VII
II. BROADER PERSPECTIVE
It is useful to place our proposal into a broader context. First, incentivizing the development of narrow-spectrum
antibiotics has to be matched by the development and use of efficient diagnostic techniques to quickly and precisely
determine the type of bacterial strain that causes a health problem and by collecting information regarding the type of
bacterial strain, the treatment and its outcome. Many OECD countries have already implemented extended reporting
systems (see e.g. the Swiss antibiotic strategy 2015 [29]).
In addition to the development of narrow-spectrum agents, it is important to also consider alternative approaches
such as medication that sustains and boosts the human immune system during infections, or improved sterilization and
sanitation in hospitals [6]. Other strategies for fighting bacterial infections, such as targeting virulence or treatment
with antibodies or phage [30–32], are also alternatives to antibiotics.
In practice, it will not be easy to encourage pharmaceutical companies to refocus their R&D activities. The
disappointing finding that genomics did not lead to many new classes of antibiotics caused the close-down of many
antibiotic research laboratories [2, 33]. Currently, the pipeline of new ideas seems to be rather small (see Fig. 1),
while the costs of clinical trials are very high. The authors of Ref. [34] analyzed the clinical trial costs of 726 studies
that were conducted between 2010-2015. In the initial clinical trial phase, the median cost was found to be 3.4 million
2 https://amractionfund.com/, retrieved on July 13, 2020.
4Figure 2. Model schematic. Susceptible individuals (X) can be infected with bacterial strain i at rate bi. Infected individuals
in state Yi recover spontaneously at rate ri. The corresponding antibiotic-induced recovery rate of antibiotic A is fiBhiB.
However, only a fraction 1− siB of individuals in state Yi recovers after a treatment with antibiotic B. The remaining fraction
siB becomes resistant against antibiotic B and ends up in a compartment Yj of bacterial strains exhibiting more resistances. The
sets of effective antibiotics in compartments Yi and Yj are Ai and Aj , respectively. Infection and recovery processes with the
respective rates are also present in compartment Yj . For the case of n = 3 antibiotics, we show the possible antibiotic-treatment
classes A1,A2, . . . ,A8.
USD and the median cost of phase III3 in the development process was reported to be more than 20 million USD.
High development costs of antibiotic drugs limit the number of players in this area and require major companies to
be involved in the development process. A good research ecosystem for antibiotic development necessarily involves
large companies, entailing significant in-house efforts, but also collaborations with academia, buying or investing in
SMEs, and joint ventures with other large pharmaceutical companies. An appropriately designed refunding scheme
can help to foster such a research ecosystem.
There are also arguments that the development of new antibiotics is not so critical. The emergence of antibiotic
resistance, even for new classes of antibiotics, is inevitable and one may conclude that research and development efforts
should mainly focus on antibiotic substances that are effective against highly resistant strains (see e.g. Ref. [2]).
A recent report published by the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies [3] suggests a multifold
R&D approach to combat AMR that includes: (i) push incentives (e.g., direct funding and tax incentives) and pull
incentives (e.g., milestone prize and patent buyout) for the development of new antibiotics, (ii) research in diagnostics
(e.g., rapid tests to distinguish between bacterial and viral infections), and (iii) vaccine research.
Our proposed refunding scheme is a complementary public-private initiative to foster the development of new
antibiotics.
III. MODELING ANTIBIOTIC TREATMENT
A. Treatment of infections with n antibiotics
In order to motivate the refunding scheme and model population-level dynamics of antibiotic resistance, we first
introduce a corresponding mathematical framework that is able to account for an arbitrary number of antibiotics. We
describe the interaction between infectious and susceptible individuals in terms of a susceptible-infected-susceptible
(SIS) model [36] whose infected compartment is sub-divided into compartments that can each be treated with certain
antibiotics. We indicate a susceptible state by X and use Yi to denote infected states that are sensitive to antibiotics
in the set Ai. If the set A2 contains two antibiotics A and B (i.e., A2 = {A,B}), individuals in state Y2 can be treated
with these two antibiotics but not with a potentially available third antibiotic C that can be used to treat individuals
in state Y1, where A1 = {A,B,C} (see Fig. 2).
We describe antibiotic-resistance dynamics in terms of a mass-action model of multiple antibiotic therapy (see
3 Phase III clinical trials are the last phase of clinical research that has to be satisfactorily completed before regulatory agencies will
approve a new drug. Such trials usually involve large patient groups (ca. 300–3000 volunteers who have the disease or condition) and
require comparatively long observation periods ranging between 1–4 years [35].
5Figure 3. Antibiotic-resistance network. For the case of n = 4 antibiotics, we show the antibiotic-resistance network.
Nodes correspond to states in which the indicated antibiotics are effective and edges between nodes represent the development
of resistant strains due to the usage of certain antibiotics. In the shown example, single-antibiotic therapy is being used. That
is, no combinations of antibiotics are being administered to patients.
Fig. 2):
dx
dt
= −x
N∑
i=1
biyi +
N∑
i=1
riyi +
 N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ai
fijhij (1− sij) yi
+ λ− dx ,
dyi
dt
= bixyi − riyi − ciyi −
∑
j∈Ai
fijhijyi +
∑
k<i
∑
j∈S(Ai)
fkjhkjskjyk ,
(1)
where x and yi are the fractions of individuals in states X and Yi, respectively. An infection with bacterial strain i
occurs at rate bi and the corresponding (spontaneous) recovery rate is ri. Throughout the manuscript, we use the
convention that as i increases, the corresponding bacteria become more resistant. We also account for the fitness
cost associated with antibiotic resistance (i.e., ri − r1 > 0 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , N}) [37]. Additional antibiotic-induced
recovery from compartment i with antibiotic j ∈ Ai occurs with rate fijhij , where fij is the proportion of antibiotic
j ∈ Ai, relative to other antibiotics, that is used to treat Yi. However, only a fraction 1 − sij actually recovers,
whereas the remaining fraction sij develops a resistance against antibiotic j ∈ Ai. The birth rate of new susceptible
individuals is λ and the corresponding death rate is d. For infected individuals in state Yi, the death rate is ci. The
set S(Ai) contains all antibiotics that were used to arrive at the partially or completely resistant compartment Yi
from other states Yk (k < i) with less resistances. For example, the use of single antibiotics (i.e., one per patient) is
described by
S(Ai) =
{⋃
k
Ak \ Ai
∣∣∣∣Ak ∈ {A1,A2, . . . ,AN}, |Ak| = |Ai|+ 1,Ak ∩ Ai 6= ∅
}
(2)
and, in this case, each antibiotic is used with proportions fij = 1/|Ai|, where |A| is the cardinality of set A. We
illustrate an example of a corresponding antibiotic-resistance network for n = 4 antibiotics in Fig. 3. Nodes in such
a resistance network represent states Yi and edges describe treatment strategies. In the example we show in Fig. 3,
only single antibiotics (no combinations) are being used for treatment.
The general antibiotic-resistance model (see Eq. (1)) has N different compartments, which correspond to N re-
sistance states, each accounting for a certain set of effective antibiotics. We denote the total number of antibiotics
by n. What is the number of resistance states N that belongs to a certain number of antibiotics n? Considering
the antibiotic-resistance network of Fig. 3, we observe that the total number of resistance states N is the sum over
all possible combinations of single antibiotics plus one (representing the completely resistant state). For n different
antibiotics, we thus have to consider N = 1 +
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
= 2n different states Yi (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}). We order them
in the following way. We denote by Y1 the infected state that can be successfully treated with all antibiotics, whereas
YN represents an infection with a completely resistant strain. Let k ≤ n be the number of effective antibiotics. For a
6wild-type strain, the number of effective antibiotics is k = n. In each layer of the antibiotic-resistance network, there
are
(
n
k
)
different strains. For a treatment with single antibiotics (see Fig. 3), there are always
(
n
k
)
nodes with k edges
in a certain layer that need to be connected to
(
n
k−1
)
nodes in the following layer. The relative difference is
k
(
n
k
)(
n
k−1
) = (n− k + 1) !
(n− k) ! = n− k + 1 . (3)
This equation implies that n − k + 1 elements from the current layer are mapped to one element in the next layer.
In the first layer (k = 4) of the network that we show in Fig. 3, one element from the current layer is mapped to one
element in the next layer. In the second layer (k = 3), two elements are mapped to one element in the third layer.
Similar considerations apply to other treatment protocols (e.g., combination treatment with multiple antibiotics) and
help to formulate the corresponding set of rate equations.
Previous models only considered the treatment with two and three antibiotics [24–26]. Our generalization to
N compartments enables us to provide insights into the higher-dimensional nature of the dynamical development
of antibiotic resistances. In Appendices A and B we compare the outlined single-antibiotic therapy approach with
combination treatment for different numbers of antibiotics. We also demonstrate in Appendix B that the mathematical
form of the stationary solution of Eq. (1) is unaffected by the number of antibiotics. Still, more antibiotics can be
useful to slow down the development of completely resistant strains, suggesting that rolling out more antibiotics is
useful. However, as we will discuss below, fostering the development of particular types of narrow-spectrum antibiotics
is much more powerful to slow down the occurrence of completely resistant strains and reduce the number of deaths
than developing broad-spectrum antibiotics.
B. Performance measures
We can compare different treatment protocols in terms of different metrics including the total stationary population
P ∗ := x∗ +
N∑
i=1
y∗i , (4)
where the asterisk denotes the stationary densities of x and yi. Another possible metric is the gain of healthy
individuals
G(T ) :=
∫ T
0
x(t) dt−
∫ T
0
x(t;hij = 0)dt , (5)
through antibiotic treatment during some time, denoted by T , where x(t;hij = 0) denotes the proportion of susceptible
individuals in the absence of treatment (i.e., hij = 0 for all i, j).
Finally, we can calculate the time until half of the infected individuals are infected by bacterial strains that are
resistant against any antibiotic. This “half-life” of non-resistance is given by:
T1/2 :=
{
t
∣∣∣∣ yN (t)∑N
i=1 yi(t)
=
1
2
}
. (6)
As mentioned above and proven in the Appendix, the long-term stationary population P ∗ is no suitable performance
measure, since P ∗ is identical for all treatment protocols that we will consider in the following sections. However,
both G(T ) and T1/2 are suitable measures to compare different development strategies for antibiotics. In addition,
we will also use G1/2 := G(T1/2) as performance metric.
IV. NARROW VERSUS BROAD SPECTRUM ANTIBIOTICS
A. Research and development opportunities
To provide a formal representation of both the antibiotics dilemma and the refunding scheme, we consider the
simplest case with n = 2 antibiotics. In Sec. VI, we discuss a more general refunding approach that can be used in
conjunction with the general antibiotic-resistance model of Sec. III.
7Figure 4. Growth of multi-resistant strains under 50/50 and 100/0 treatment. The evolution of wild-type y1 (black
solid line) and completely resistant infections y4 (red solid line) under 50/50 treatment with f1A = f1B1 = 0.5 (a) and 100/0
treatment with f1A = 1 and f1B2 = 0 (b). To obtain the solutions shown, we numerically solve Eqs. (7) with a classical
Runge-Kutta scheme in the time interval [0, T ] with T = 100 setting λ = 100, d = 1, c = 1.5, b = 0.03, ri = (2− k)0.1 (k is the
number of effective antibiotics in the respective layer), h = 1, s = 0.05, αB = γB =  ≥ 0. The initial conditions are x(0) = 50,
y1(0) = 33.33, y2(0) = y3(0) = y4(0) = 0.
For the model variant with n = 2 antibiotics, the corresponding sets of antibiotics for the N = 22 = 4 infected
compartments are A1 = {A,B}, A2 = {A}, A3 = {B}, and A4 = ∅.
We assume that antibiotic A is already on the market. For the development of a second antibiotic, there are two
possibilities for pharmaceutical companies.
• Antibiotic B1: This is a broad-spectrum antibiotic that is as effective as antibiotic A against wild-type strains.
It is also effective against strains that are resistant against A.
• Antibiotic B2: This is a narrow-spectrum antibiotic that is, by a factor 1 − αB (0 ≤ αB ≤ 1), less effective
against wild-type strains. However, antibiotic B2 is, by a factor 1 + γB (γB > 0), more effective against strains
that are resistant against A than A is effective against strains that are resistant to B2.
Note that we use the terms “narrow” and “broad” to classify antibiotics according to their effectiveness against
certain bacterial strains 4.
We will later turn to costs and chances to develop such antibiotics, but at the moment, we consider what happens
if either B1 or B2 is being developed and used for treating patients.
B. The model
For both types of antibiotics, we derive the corresponding population-level dynamics according to Eq. (1):
dx
dt
= −bx (y1 + y2 + y3 + y4) + r1y1 + r2y2 + r3y3 + r4y4
+ h(1− s) {y1 [f1A + (1− )f1B] + y2 + y3(1 + )}+ λ− dx ,
dy1
dt
= [bx− r1 − c− h (f1A + (1− )f1B)] y1 ,
dy2
dt
= (bx− r2 − c− h) y2 + hs(1− )f1By1 ,
dy3
dt
= (bx− r3 − c− h(1 + )) y3 + hsf1Ay1 ,
dy4
dt
= (bx− r4 − c) y4 + hs [y2 + (1 + )y3] ,
(7)
4 An alternative mathematical definition of “narrow” and “broad” would be to classify combination treatment as a broad-spectrum
approach and single-antibiotic therapy as narrow.
8where we have set γB = αB =  ∈ [0, 1] (see Sec. IV A). Furthermore, we assumed that the antibiotic-induced
recovery rate, the infection rate, and the fraction of individuals that develop an antibiotic resistance is constant for all
antibiotics, i.e. hij = h, bi = b and sij = s. For modeling antibiotic B1, we simply set  = 0. If antibiotic B2 is present,
we set the values of these parameters to the efficiency disadvantages and advantages of B2 relative to A. Note that
the assumption of an equal infection rate b of different strains is justified by corresponding empirical findings [38].
We now focus on four different treatment strategies:
I. Treatment with antibiotic B1 and symmetric use of antibiotics (i.e., 50/50):
Hence, we have  = 0. Moreover, since we consider a symmetric use, f1A = 0.5 and f1B = 0.5, this case
describes a treatment strategy where 50% of patients with a wild-type-strain infection receive antibiotic A and
the remaining 50% receive antibiotic B1. Both antibiotics A and B1 have the same effect on strains 1 and 2 and
1 and 3, respectively.
II. Treatment with antibiotic B1 and asymmetric use of antibiotics (i.e., 100/0):
Hence, we again have  = 0. We only use the new antibiotic B1 against strains that are resistant against A. All
patients with a wild-type-strain infection receive antibiotic A, i.e. f1A = 1 and f1B = 0.
III. Treatment with antibiotic B2 and symmetric use of antibiotics:
The symmetric use implies f1A/f1B = 50/50 for wild-type-strain infections. The prefactor 1−  accounts for the
corresponding recovery-rate difference in the wild-type compartment. However, antibiotic B2 is more effective
in compartment 3, where individuals have an antibiotic-induced recovery rate of h(1 + ).
IV. Treatment with antibiotic B2 and asymmetric use of antibiotics:
In this scenario, we only use antibiotic A in compartment Y1 and thus set f1A = 1 and f1B = 0.
C. Comparisons
We now compare treatment strategies I–IV in terms of P ∗, G, T1/2, G1/2 (see Figs. 5 and 6), and the use of the
antibiotics A and B1 and B2, respectively. We can keep track of the consumption of antibiotics A and B by integrating
dCA
dt
= f1Ay1 + y2 and
dCB
dt
= f1By1 + y3 (8)
over time. We now compare scenarios I–IV, by varying  from 0 to 1.
We first look for differences between the evolution of the wild-type and fully resistant compartments under 50/50
and 100/0 treatment. Based on the simulation data that we show in Fig. 4, we conclude that the variability in y1 and
y4 is much larger under 50/50 treatment than under 100/0 treatment. Comparing the performance measures P
∗, G,
T1/2, and G1/2 (see Figs. 5 and 6), we find that the 50/50 and 100/0 are equivalent for  = 0. For larger values of ,
the gain G of the 50/50 strategy is smaller than the gain of the 100/0 strategy. Differences between the two treatment
strategies are also reflected in the final consumption CA and CB of antibiotics A and B (see Fig. 7). For  & 0.5, the
100/0 treatment leads to a significantly lower consumption/return of both antibiotics compared to 50/50 protocol.
These figures highlight a fundamental dilemma. Developing a narrow-spectrum antibiotic B2 is highly beneficial for
society, but then it should only be used very little, namely against the strains which are resistant against antibiotic A.
We refer to this issue as the antibiotics dilemma: Developing a narrow-spectrum antibiotic against resistant bacteria
is most attractive for society, but least attractive for companies, since usage is should be limited, so that sales are
low.
V. REFUNDING SCHEMES
A. The basic principles
The situation is further complicated by additional properties of antibiotics development and usage. First, the
development costs are enormous, in the range of several billion USD, and second the chances to succeed are low. This
is true in general for new drugs [22] but more pronounced for antibiotics, where the success probability may be as
low as 5% [23]. Third, once a narrow-spectrum antibiotics is developed and it is also effective to some degree against
wild-type strains, using it for wild-type strains should not be commercially attractive.
To overcome the antibiotics dilemma and associated complications, we suggest to introduce a refunding scheme for
the use of newly developed antibiotics. The refunding scheme works as follows:
9Figure 5. Treatment with two antibiotics (50/50 strategy). We numerically solve Eqs. (7) with a classical Runge-Kutta
scheme in the time interval [0, T ] with T = 100 setting λ = 100, d = 1, c = 1.5, b = 0.03, ri = (2 − k)0.1 (k is the number of
effective antibiotics in the respective layer), h = 1, s = 0.05, and f1A = f1B1 = 0.5, αB = γB =  ≥ 0. The initial conditions
are x(0) = 50, y1(0) = 33.33, y2(0) = y3(0) = y4(0) = 0.
1. An antibiotics fund should be started by initial contributions from the industry and public institutions like the
establishment of the recent AMR Action fund. In addition all antibiotic use is charged with a small fee which
is channeled continuously into the antibiotics fund.
2. Firms that develop new antibiotics obtain a refund from the fund.
3. The refund for a particular antibiotic is calculated with a formula that satisfies the following three properties:
• There is a fixed payment for a successful development of an antibiotic, i.e. an antibiotic that is approved
by the public health agency responsible for such approvals (e.g., the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA)). This part is in the spirit of Ref. [39], as it is equivalent to an advanced market commitment.
Pharmaceutical companies know that once an approved patent for a new antibiotics is awarded, they will
be reimbursed part of their development costs.
• The refund is strongly increasing with the use of the new antibiotic for currently resistant bacteria, com-
pared to other newly developed antibiotics for this purpose. This part is the resistance premium.
• The refund is weakly or strongly declining in the use of the antibiotics for non-resistant bacteria, compared
to other antibiotics used for this purpose.
The objective of our refunding scheme is to financially incentivize pharmaceutical companies to undertake R&D for
new narrow-spectrum antibiotics, by using a minimum-size antibiotics fund. As we will demonstrate below, all three
elements are necessary to achieve this purpose.
Several remarks are in order: First, refunding schemes are widely discussed in the environmental literature to
provide incentives for firms to reduce pollution [40]. Second, simple forms of refunding schemes could also be used in
other contexts where pharmaceutical companies have only little financial interest to investing in drug research, due
to potentially low sales volumes. This is, for instance, the case for orphan drug development and vaccine research
10
Figure 6. Treatment with two antibiotics (100/0 strategy). We numerically solve Eqs. (7) with a classical Runge-Kutta
scheme in the time interval [0, T ] with T = 100 setting λ = 100, d = 1, c = 1.5, b = 0.03, ri = (2 − k)0.1 (k is the number of
effective antibiotics in the respective layer), h = 1, s = 0.05, and f1A = 1, f1B2 = 0, αB = γB =  ≥ 0. The initial conditions
are x(0) = 50, y1(0) = 33.33, y2(0) = y3(0) = y4(0) = 0.
for viral infections including SARS and Ebola or enduring epidemic diseases in the sense of Ref. [41]. However, for
such cases, refunding schemes are much easier to construct, since they can solely rely on the usage, e.g. the number
of vaccinated individuals. For antibiotics—because of the antibiotics dilemma—one has to construct new types of
refunding schemes with “sticks and carrots”: The carrot for using the antibiotic against bacterial strains resistant
against other antibiotics and sticks for using the antibiotics against wild-type strains. Those complications do not
arise with the aforementioned (simple) refunding schemes in the environmental sciences. Third, one might also achieve
sufficiently-strong incentives to develop new antibiotics without a refunding scheme by allowing for very high prices
when an antibiotic is used against bacterial strains that are resistant against other antibiotics. We do not pursue
this approach since enormously high prices for a treatment would raise ethical and health concerns, since certain
therapies might then not be affordable anymore, which, in turn, would further fuel the spreading of resistant bacteria.
Moreover, since the use of an antibiotic against wild-type strains exerts a negative externality on all individuals—due
to the possible emergence of resistant bacteria in response to this use—all cases of antibiotics use contribute to the
financing of narrow-spectrum antibiotics. Levying a fee on antibiotic use not only fills up the antibiotic fund and
incentives the development of narrow-spectrum antibiotics, it also promotes the cautious use of existing antibiotics.
Both effects internalize the negative externality caused by antibiotic use.
B. Refunding schemes for two antibiotics
The mathematical model we formulate for the proposed refunding and incentivization scheme discussed above
includes two elements:
• There is a fixed amount, denoted by α, which a pharmaceutical company obtains if it successfully develops a
new antibiotic Bi, i.e. an antibiotic approved by a public health authority.
11
Figure 7. Antibiotic consumption. We show the stationary antibiotic consumption limt→∞ CA and limt→∞ CB for the 50/50
treatment with f1A = f1B1 = 0.5 (a) and 100/0 treatment with f1A = 1 and f1B2 = 0 (b). We numerically solve Eqs. (7) with a
classical Runge-Kutta scheme in the time interval [0, T ] with T = 100 setting λ = 100, d = 1, c = 1.5, b = 0.03, ri = (2− k)0.1
(k is the number of effective antibiotics in the respective layer), h = 1, s = 0.05, and αB = γB =  ≥ 0. The initial conditions
are x(0) = 50, y1(0) = 33.33, y2(0) = y3(0) = y4(0) = 0.
• There is a variable refund that is determined by the following refunding function:
g(f1Biy1, f3Biy3) = β
f3Biy3
γf1Biy1 + f3Biy3
, (9)
where i ∈ {1, 2} (to represents antibiotics B1 and B2) and β and γ are scaling parameters, with β being a large
number and γ satisfying γ ≥ 1. The refunding function g(f1Biy1, f3Biy3) determines the relative use of the new
antibiotic in compartment 3 (A-resistant strains) compared to the total use of the antibiotic weighted by the
parameter γ. We require the refunding function to be
– bounded according to 0 ≤ g(f1Biy1, f3Biy3) ≤ β,
– increasing in the use for currently resistant bacteria in comparison with other newly developed antibiotics
used for this purpose: f3Biy3,
– declining in the use of antibiotics for non-resistant bacteria in comparison with other antibiotics used for
this purpose: f1Biy1,
– maximal if the antibiotic is only used to treat A-resistant strains and 0 if it is only used for nonresistant
strain treatment.
Note that refunding scheme uses three free parameters α, β, and γ. While in the simplest cases, only one or two
parameters would be needed, we will see in the subsequent section that all three parameters are necessary to achieve
the objective of the refunding scheme.
The total refund that a successful pharmaceutical company receives in the time interval [0, T ] for developing an
antibiotic Bi is given by
Ri(T ) := α+
∫ T
0
β
f3Biy3(f1Biy1 + f3Biy3)
γf1Biy1 + f3Biy3
dt . (10)
We note that for γ = 1, the refund is solely determined by f3By3 and the use for compartment 1 is irrelevant for
the refund. For γ > 1, the use of antibiotics for compartment 1 decreases the refund.
C. Incentivizing development
We next focus on the research and development efforts of pharmaceutical companies and on how antibiotics are used
once they have been developed. For this purpose, we first consider the situation without refunding. Companies are
assumed to make a risk-neutral evaluation of the profit opportunities and loss risks from investing in such developments.
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For simplicity, we neglect discounting. Then, without refunding (i.e., without Ri(T )), the net profit of a company
that develops an antibiotic Bi is given by:
pii = qi(pi − vi)
∫ T
0
dCBi
dt
dt−Ki,= qi(pi − vi)
∫ T
0
(f1Biy1 + f3Biy3) dt−Ki , (11)
where Ki denotes the total development costs of Bi, and qi the probability of success when the development is
undertaken. Moreover, pi is the revenue per unit of the antibiotic used in medical treatments and vi are the production
costs per unit.
Note that in our example with two antibiotics, f3Bi = 1, since only drug Bi can be used for A-resistant strains.
We assume that without refunding, pii is (strongly) negative, because of high development costs Ki and low success
probabilities qi. The task of a refunding scheme is now three-fold: First, it has to render developing new antibiotics
commercially viable. Second, it has to render developing narrow-spectrum antibiotics more attractive than developing
broad-spectrum antibiotics. Third, if a narrow-spectrum antibiotic is developed that is also effective against wild-type
strains, but less so than others, the refunding scheme should make the use against wild-type strains unattractive.
With a refunding scheme in place, we directly look at the conditions for such a scheme to achieve the break-
even condition, i.e. a situation at which pi becomes zero and investing into antibiotics development becomes just
commercially viable. The general break-even condition for a newly developed antibiotic Bi is given by
Ki = qi(pi − vi)
∫ T
0
(f1Biy1 + f3Biy3) dt+ qiRi(T )
= αqi + qi
∫ T
0
[
β
f3Biy3
γf1Biy1 + f3Biy3
+ (pi − vi)
]
(f1Biy1 + f3Biy3) dt .
(12)
Clearly, refunding increases the profits from developing new antibiotics. There are many combinations of the refunding
parameters α, β, and γ that can achieve this break-even condition. However and more subtly, the refunding has
to increase the incentives for the development of narrow-spectrum antibiotics more than those for broad-spectrum
antibiotics. This can be achieved by an appropriate choice of the scaling parameter, as we will illustrate next.
D. Critical conditions for refunding parameters
To derive the critical refunding parameters, we assume that the parameter α, with 0 < α < Ki, is given and thus
a fixed share of the R&D costs is covered by the antibiotics fund. Based on the break-even condition (see Eq. (12)),
we obtain the following general condition that the parameters β and γ have to satisfy:
β =
Ki − αqi − qi(pi − vi)
∫ T
0
(f1By1 + f3By3)dt
qi
∫ T
0
f3By3
γf1By1+f3By3
(f1By1 + f3By3)dt
. (13)
The goal of our refunding scheme is to incentivize pharmaceutical companies to produce narrow-spectrum antibiotics
B2 that are only used against currently resistant strains (see treatment strategy IV in Sec. IV). Thus, the refunding
scheme has to satisfy two conditions: first, with the development of the antibiotic B2, the company achieves break-
even. Second, developing antibiotic B1 is not attractive, i.e. the profit is negative. To satisfy the first condition, we
use Eq. (13) and obtain the optimal value
β∗ =
K2 − αq2 − q2(p2 − v2)
∫ T
0
f3B2y3 dt
q2
∫ T
0
f3B2y3 dt
, (14)
where we used that f1B2 = 0 (see Sec. IV). To achieve negative profit for using B1, we need to choose the parameter
γ such that developing a broad-spectrum antibiotic B1 and applying it in y1 and y3 (see treatment strategy I in
Sec. IV) is not more attractive than developing a narrow-spectrum antibiotic B2 according to treatment strategy IV
(see Sec. IV). Thus, the refunding scheme needs to satisfy
αq1 + q1
∫ T
0
[
β∗
f3B1y3
γf1B1y1 + f3B1y3
+ (p1 − v1)
]
(f1B1y1 + f3B1y3) dt−K1 < 0 . (15)
If we evaluate inequality 15 as an equality, we obtain a critical value for γ, denoted by γ∗1 , for certain values of β
∗,
p1, and v1. For γ > γ
∗
1 , it is more profitable to produce a narrow-spectrum antibiotic B2 and get a higher refund
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Figure 8. Critical refunding parameters. We show the critical refunding parameters β∗ (a) and γ∗ (b–d) for different 
and population sizes 50 × 106, 100 × 106, and 150 × 106. The critical refunding parameter β∗ increases with population size
(a). A finite γ∗1 and γ
∗
2 is indicated by the black solid line, whereas the left hand side of Eq. (15) is always positive in the
grey-shaded region (b–d). We numerically solve Eqs. (7) with a classical Runge-Kutta scheme in the time interval [0, T ] with
T = 100 setting λ = 100, d = 1, c = 1.5, b = 0.03, ri = (2 − k)0.1 (k is the number of effective antibiotics in the respective
layer), h = 1, s = 0.05, αB = γB =  ≥ 0. The initial conditions are x(0) = 50, y1(0) = 33.33, y2(0) = y3(0) = y4(0) = 0. All
compartments were rescaled according to the shown population sizes.
than to develop a broad-spectrum antibiotic B1 and sell more units. We observe that this critical value is uniquely
determined, since the left side is strictly decreasing in γ. We discuss conditions for the existence of γ∗1 in the next
section.
Third, we need to make sure that a narrow-spectrum antibiotic B2 is not used for wild-type bacterial strains (see
the 50/50 treatment strategy III in Sec. IV). Since a narrow-spectrum antibiotic may be also effective for wild-type
strains, the refunding scheme should exclude any incentives to use B2 in compartment Y1. In terms of our refunding
scheme, this could be achieved by replacing the 50/50 treatment strategy involving antibiotic B1 on the left-hand side
of Eq. (15) with the 50/50 treatment strategy involving antibiotic B2. Note that the resulting critical value for γ,
which we denote by γ∗2 , is different from γ
∗
1 . An alternative to imposing this additional constraint on the refunding
scheme is to implement strict medical guidelines which demand that less-effective antibiotics should not be used in
compartment Y1.
Together, Eqs. (14) and (15) determine the refunding scheme that ensures that a pharmaceutical company breaks
even at time T by developing a narrow-spectrum antibiotic, does not focus on broad-spectrum antibiotics and the
narrow-spectrum antibiotics is not misused once it is developed.
E. Numerical example
We now focus on a simple example to illustrate how our refunding scheme can incentivize the development of
narrow-spectrum antibiotics. For this purpose, we use the parameters listed in Tab. I. To work with reasonable
population sizes, we apply our refunding scheme to populations with 50, 100, and 150 million people and rescale the
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quantity symbol value
success probability qi 0.1
development costs Ki 2 billion USD
refunding offset α 1 billion USD
revenue per unit pi 100 USD
production costs per unit vi 70 USD
Table I. Refunding calibration parameters.
corresponding compartments that we used to determine the antibiotic consumption in Fig. 7.
We first determine β∗ according to Eq. (14) and show the results in Fig. 8 (a). Since the consumption CB2 decreases
with  (see Fig. 7), the critical refunding parameter β∗ has to increase with . Before discussing the corresponding
values of γ∗1 and γ
∗
2 , we briefly summarize the conditions for the existence of a critical value γ
∗ and distinguish three
cases.
Case I: If qia+qi
∫ T
0
[β∗ + (pi − vi)] (f1Biy1+f3Biy3)dt−Ki < 0 (i = 1, 2 and f(·) is chosen according to some treatment
strategy), we find that Eq. (15) is satisfied for any γ > 0 independent of the underlying refunding scheme since,
for finite γ,
β∗
f3Biy3
γf1Biy1 + f3Biy3
= β∗
1
1 + γ
f1Biy1
f3Biy3
≤ β∗ . (16)
Case II: If qia+ qi
∫ T
0
[β∗ + (pi − vi)] (f1Biy1 + f3Biy3)dt−Ki > 0 and qia+ qi
∫ T
0
(pi − vi)(f1Biy1 + f3Biy3)dt−Ki < 0,
there exists a γ∗ > 0 such that the left-hand side of Eq. (15) (for Bi and corresponding refunding parameters)
is equal to zero.
Case III: If qia+qi
∫ T
0
(pi−vi)(f1Biy1+f3Biy3)dt−Ki > 0, it is not possible to satisfy Eq. (15) (for Bi and corresponding
refunding parameters), since pi − vi is too large.
For the parameters of Tab. I, we show the resulting γ∗1 and γ
∗
2 in Fig. 8 (b–d). We observe that γ
∗
1 always exists for
the chosen parameters, whereas γ∗2 only exists for certain values of  (case II). Case I does not exist in the outlined
example, since the chosen β∗ (Eq. (14)) is too large to satisfy Eq. (15) (evaluated for B2 and corresponding refunding
parameters) for any γ > 0. At the boundary separating cases II and III, we find that γ∗2 diverges. Note that the size
of region associated with case III increases with population size. To avoid such scenarios in real-world applications of
our refunding scheme, we could, for instance, reduce the refunding offset α.
To summarize:
• For intermediate consumption of B2 in 50/50 treatment (see treatment strategy III in Sec. IV) and corresponding
returns, a finite γ∗2 exists (see Fig. 8 (b–d)). Within the green-shaded regions of Fig. 8 (b–d), Eq. (15) is satisfied
for B1 and B2 (γ > γ
∗
1 and γ > γ
∗
2), whereas the left-hand side of Eq. (15) is positive for B1 and B2 within the
red-shaded regions (γ < γ∗1 and γ < γ
∗
2).
• Within the orange-shaded regions of Fig. 8 (b–d), either γ > γ∗1 or γ > γ∗2 .
• If the expected return associated with the B2 treatment strategy III of Sec. IV is too large, there is no γ > 0
that discourages pharmaceuticals from developing such drugs (grey-shaded regions in Fig. 8 (c) and (d)).
VI. REFUNDING SCHEMES: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Using a refunding scheme as constructed above in practice requires a series of additional considerations which
we address in this section. In particular, it must be possible to apply a refunding scheme for any constellation of
antibiotics use, it must work under a variety of sources of R&D uncertainty, and it must still be effective when
diagnostic and treatment uncertainties are taken into account.
A. Generalizations
We first generalize the refunding scheme for possible treatment with more than 2 antibiotics. We assume that
currently, N1 antibiotics are used. Now, N2 new antibiotics are potentially developed, such that the total number
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of antibiotics is N = N1 + N2. Note that before new antibiotics are introduced, there is 1 non-resistant strain and
a total of 2N1 − 1 strains that are resistant to some antibiotic. Furthermore, there is one class of bacterial strains
that is resistant to all antibiotics currently on the market. The class of microbes that is resistant to all N antibiotics
has the index kˆ = 2N . The generalized refunding scheme still consists of a fixed refund α and a variable refund that
depends on the use of the antibiotic in the different compartments. The scaling parameter γ1 ”punishes” the use
of the antibiotic for wild-type strains by decreasing the refund. In addition, γ2 scales the reward of the use of the
antibiotic for strains that are resistant to some, but not all, antibiotics currently on the market. Note that γ2 could
be negative, such that the refund still increases in the use for partially resistant strains. Lastly, the refund strongly
increases in the use for fully-resistant strains in the class kˆ = 2N .
The refunding scheme is given by:
g(f˜i) = β
∑2N
j=2 fjBiyj
γ1f1Biy1 + γ2
∑2N−1
j=2 fjBiyj + fkˆBiykˆ
, (17)
where f˜i denotes the vector of the usage of a newly developed drug Bi in all compartments Yj with j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
The use in each compartment is given by fjBiyj .
The break-even conditions can be established as for the 2-antibiotics case, but now with adjusted total consumption
per antibiotic and with the generalized refunding scheme.
Similarly to the extension to more than 2 antibiotics, the refunding scheme can be generalized when more than one
pharmaceutical company should be given incentives to do R&D on narrow-spectrum antibiotics. In such cases, the
refunding parameters have to be adjusted, such that with lower sales volumes for each company, it is still profitable
to undertake the R&D investments.
B. Multi-dimensional R&D uncertainties
The development and usage of antibiotics is subject to a variety of uncertainties. In particular, companies may not
know at the beginning of a development process against which type of bacterial strains the drug that might emerge
will be effective. Such uncertainties can be taken into account as follows: Suppose a pharmaceutical company starts an
R&D process for an antibiotic, but does not know initially, whether it will turn out to be broad or narrow-spectrum,
as this will only become known during or, in the worst case, at the end of the development process.
A possible solution to this issue is setting the value of β equal to β∗ + δ for some small δ > 0. Moreover, we set γ
at the critical value γ∗ for the value of β∗ + δ. Then, starting the R&D investment is profitable and the incentives
for a narrow-spectrum antibiotic are maximal. If during the R&D process, a narrow-spectrum opportunity emerges,
it will be chosen, since profits will be higher than for a broad-spectrum antibiotic. However, the company also breaks
even for a broad-spectrum antibiotic. Hence, the company faces no additional risk if it is impossible at the beginning
to evaluate whether a broad or narrow-spectrum antibiotics will result from the R&D investment.
C. Diagnostics and treatment uncertainties
The refunding scheme depends on the ability of doctors to rapidly identify the strain of bacteria that caused a
certain infection. For a fraction of such treatments, this may be impossible - in particular in emergency situations
or when rapid, high-throughput diagnostic devices are unavailable. Note that certain bacterial strains can already
be identified in a few hours by using peptide nucleic acid (PNA) fluorescent in-situ hybridization (FISH) tests, mass
spectroscopy, and polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-based methods [14].
The refunding scheme can be readily adapted to allow for diagnostic and treatment uncertainties. For instance,
one could base refunding only on diagnosed strains of bacteria against which the antibiotics is used. The refunding
parameters have to be adapted accordingly. Basing refunding only on cases in which the bacterial strain has been
diagnosed and reported would provide further incentives for pharmaceuticals to develop fast diagnostic tests to identify
the sources of infections.
A further refinement would be to provide a refund in case a newly developed antibiotic is used and turns out to
be effective. Such success targeting would be desirable, but may not be easily implementable in practice. As long as
the success rates of an antibiotic that is effective against particular bacterial strains are known or can be estimated
with sufficient precision, taking the usage/bacterial strain data would be sufficient to provide desirable incentives to
engage in R&D for narrow-spectrum antibiotics.
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D. Small firms and the R&D ecosystem
Both small biotech companies and large pharmaceutical companies play a significant role in developing new an-
tibiotics. The flexibility, nimbleness, and flat organizational structure of smaller biotech companies that specialize
in innovative antibacterial treatments can be very effective for the development of new antibiotics. Therefore, while
refunding will mostly benefit large pharmaceutical companies, the anticipation of such refunds is expected to also
motivate smaller biotech companies to step up with R&D efforts. These smaller companies can expect significant
rewards when they sell or license their patents to larger companies. Moreover, small biotech companies may receive
much more start-up funding both from venture capitalists and larger pharmaceutical companies, and one might even
consider using the antibiotics fund for this purpose as well. Hence, it is expected that the refunding scheme will be
nourishing for the entire ecosystem that develops new antibiotics.
E. The antibiotics fund and participating countries
A necessary condition for the functioning of our refunding scheme is the existence of an antibiotics fund with
sufficient equity to cover R&D incentives. Similar to the recently established AMR Action Fund, which aims at
bridging the gap between the pipeline for innovative antibiotics and patients, an antibiotics fund should be started
by initial contributions from industry and public institutions. Since it is in the collective self-interest of the pharma-
ceutical industry to solve the antibiotics dilemma—as otherwise many other business lines and their reputation will
be harmed—a significant contribution from the industry to set up the antibiotics fund can be expected, as was the
case for the AMR Action Fund.
In addition, a continuous refilling of the fund can be achieved by levying a fee on every use of existing antibiotics.
These fees have to be set in such a way that the antibiotics fund will never be empty. Since the (sometimes excessive)
use of existing antibiotics (e.g., in agricultural settings [42–44]) creates the resistance problem, levying this fee not
only helps to continuously refill the fund, but it may also help to use existing antibiotics cautiously. Ultimately, the
antibiotics fund and the refunding scheme are a mechanism to internalize the externality in antibiotics use, namely
the creation of resistant bacteria.
As in the context of slowing down climate change, the ideal implementation would involve a global refunding scheme
administered by an international agency, because reducing resistance is a global public good. However, also similar
to implementing climate-change policies, worldwide adoption should be extremely difficult and might be impossible
to achieve. As a starting point, a set of industrialized countries should agree to a treaty that fails if any of them does
not participate. Once an antibiotic fund has been initiated, a treaty should establish the continuing financing of the
antibiotics fund and the refunding scheme. The gains would be large and may lead to long-standing self-enforcing
incentives to substantially and continuously increase the chances to develop antibiotics against resistant bacteria. If
attempts to build a larger coalition fail, the European Union or the US could take the lead and become the first
country or coalition of countries that implements a refunding scheme for antibiotics.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The rapid rise of antibiotic resistance poses a serious threat to global public health. No new antibiotic has been
registered or patented for more than three decades (see Fig. 1). To counteract this situation, we introduced a novel
framework to mathematically describe the emergence of antibiotic resistance in a population that is treated with n
antibiotics. We then used this framework to develop a market-based refunding scheme that can solve the antibiotics
dilemma, i.e. which can incentivize pharmaceutical companies to reallocate resources to antimicrobial drug discovery
and, in particular, to the development of narrow-spectrum antibiotics that are effective against multiresistant bacterial
strains. We outlined how such a refunding scheme can cope with various sources of uncertainty inherent to R&D for
antibiotics as well as with diagnostic and treatment uncertainties.
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Figure A.1. Treatment with two antibiotics. We numerically solve Eqs. (A1) and (A3) with a classical Runge-Kutta
scheme setting λ = 100, d = 1, c = 1.5, b = 0.03, r1 = 0, r2 = r3 = 0.1, r4 = 0.2. In panel (a), we set h = 0 (i.e., no treatment)
and h = 1 in the remaining panels. Panel (b) shows a solution of Eq. (A1) (“single-antibiotic therapy”). The bottom panels
show solutions of Eq. (A3) (“combination therapy”) with q = 10−5 > s2 = 10−6 (c) and q = 10−8 < s2 = 10−6 (d). If q > s2,
the gain is smaller for multiple treatment. We use P ∗ and G to indicate the total stationary population size (see Eqs. (4) and
(A2)) and gain of uninfected in the considered time interval (see Eq. (5)), respectively. The gain G corresponds to the grey
shaded region and the characteristic resistance time scale T1/2 is the time when the proportion of completely resistant strains
is 50% (see Eq. (6)). G1/2 is the gain in the time interval [0, T1/2]. The initial conditions are x(0) = 50, y1(0) = 33.33, and
y2(0) = y3(0) = y4(0) = 0.
Appendix A: Combination therapy versus targeted use of antibiotics
To illustrate the difference between combination- and single-antibiotic therapy, we first derive the corresponding
mathematical results for n = 2 antibiotics {A,B} [25] and discuss the case where n > 2 in Appendix B.
For n = 2 antibiotics, the corresponding sets of antibiotics for the N = 4 infected compartments are A1 = {A,B},
A2 = {A}, A3 = {B}, and A4 = ∅. Based on Eq. (1), the treatment of patients with single broad-spectrum antibiotics
can be described by:
dx
dt
= −bx (y1 + y2 + y3 + y4) + r1y1 + r2y2 + r3y3 + r4y4
+ h(1− s) (y1 + y2 + y3) + λ− dx ,
dy1
dt
= (bx− r1 − h− c) y1 ,
dy2
dt
= (bx− r2 − h− c) y2 + 1
2
hsy1 ,
dy3
dt
= (bx− r3 − h− c) y3 + 1
2
hsy1 ,
dy4
dt
= (bx− r4 − c) y4 + hs (y2 + y3) ,
(A1)
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where we set bij = b, sij = s, hij = h, and use the proportions f1A = f1B = 1/2, f1AB = 0, f2A = 1, f2B = f2AB = 0,
f3B = 1, and f3A = f3AB = 0.
In the absence of treatment, the total stationary population is
P ∗ = x∗ + y∗1 =
r1 + c
b
+
λ
c
− d
b
− dr1
cb
. (A2)
Analytical expressions for G and T1/2 for some specific parameter constellations are summarized in Ref. [25]. We
compare the single-antibiotic therapy and targeted use of antibiotics (see Eq. (A1)) with a broad-spectrum treatment
that uses combinations of antibiotics A and B:
dx
dt
= −bx (y1 + y2 + y3 + y4) + r1y1 + r2y2 + r3y3 + r4y4
+ h(1− q)y1 + h(1− s) (y2 + y3) + λ− dx ,
dy1
dt
= (bx− r1 − h− c) y1 ,
dy2
dt
= (bx− r2 − h− c) y2 ,
dy3
dt
= (bx− r3 − h− c) y3 ,
dy4
dt
= (bx− r4 − c) y4 + hqy1 + hs (y2 + y3) ,
(A3)
where q is the fraction of double resistances that develop from the combined treatment of the wild-type strain (Y1)
with antibiotics A and B. In Eq. (A3), we use the proportions f1AB = 1, f1A = f1B = 0, f2AB = 1, f2A = f2B = 0,
f3AB = 1, and f3A = f3B = 0.
We show a comparison between the outlined single-antibiotic and combination therapy treatment in Fig. A.1. If
q > s2, we find that, in agreement with earlier results [25], the single-antibiotic treatment outperforms combination
therapy. For q < s2 (i.e., for very small probabilities of double resistance resulting from combination treatment of
wild-type strains), single-antibiotic treatment is not as efficient as broad-spectrum therapy anymore.
Appendix B: Properties of the general model
In this Appendix, we establish several properties of the general antibiotic-treatment model (see Eq. (1)). In
particular, in the absence of antibiotic treatment and for sufficiently strong treatment, we show that the mathematical
structure of the equation describing the stationary population P ∗ is unaffected by the number of antibiotics and
differences in treatment protocols. The term “sufficiently strong treatment” [25] means that growth factor b/(rN +cN )
in the completely resistant compartment is larger than the growth factor b/(ri + ci +
∑
j∈Ai fijhij) in any other
compartment yi (i < N).
In the absence of antibiotic therapy (i.e., hij = 0 for all i, j), we find that the stationary population of susceptible
individuals is x∗ = (r1 + c1)/b1 and y∗ = λ/c1 − d/b1 − (dr1)/(b1c1).
The stationary solution under sufficiently strong treatment with y∗N 6= 0 implies that y∗1 = y∗2 = . . . = y∗N−1 = 0.
Independent of treatment protocol details, the stationary solution is x∗ = (rN + cN )/bN and y∗N = λ/cN − d/bN −
(drN )/(bNcN ). Even if the stationary behavior has a similar form for general numbers of antibiotics n, the dynamical
features and corresponding characteristics such as T1/2 exhibit a more complex dependence on n, which we analyze
numerically in Fig. B.2.
We observe that for the considered parameters in the “q > sn regime” (see Appendix A), single-antibiotic therapy
treatment still outperforms combination treatment. The larger the number of antibiotics n, the smaller relative
differences between various performance metrics (see insets in Fig. B.2).
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Figure B.2. Treatment with multiple antibiotics. We numerically solve the n-antibiotic generalizations of Eqs. (A1) and
(A3) with a classical Runge-Kutta scheme in the time interval [0, T ] with T = 600 and λ = 100, d = 1, c = 1.5, b = 0.03,
ri = (n− k)0.1 (k is the number of effective antibiotics in the respective layer), h = 1, s = 10−3, and q = 10−2.5n. In panels (a)
and (b), we show the total stationary population size P ∗ (see Eqs. (4) and (A2)) and the gain of uninfected G (see Eq. (5)); in
panels (c) and (d), we show the time T1/2 when the proportion of completely resistant strains is 50% (see Eq. (6)) and the gain
G1/2 in the time interval [0, T1/2]. The insets in each panel represent the ratio of the single and combination therapy values.
The initial conditions are x(0) = 50, y1(0) = 33.33, and y2(0) = y3(0) = y4(0) = 0.
